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I. INTRODUCTION
Meet David Oakley: a Wisconsin resident and convicted deadbeat dad of nine
minor children. Oakley is $25,000 arrears in child support payments.1 Despite his
physical ability to do so, Oakley cannot seem to keep a fulltime job, and he openly
admits that he will never be able to support his current or future children.2
Now meet Kristie Trammell: an Indiana resident convicted of child neglect on
two separate occasions. One of theses convictions resulted from Trammell’s neglect
of her infant son, J.T., who consequently died of severe malnutrition and
dehydration.3 Trammell ignored many signs of J.T.’s worsening condition and also
ignored the warnings of several people, including doctors and her own mother, that
J.T. needed proper care and medical attention.4
For both of these defendants, the respective Wisconsin and Indiana trial courts
chose to issue sentences of probation.5 Recognizing that probationers do not enjoy
the absolute liberty that non-probationers do,6 the sentences included conditions
restricting the defendants’ rights to procreate. On appeal, however, one court struck
down this probation condition as excessive.7
Each of the courts deliberated over the issue of whether a restriction that
abrogated a probationer’s right to have a child was reasonably related to the goals of
the probation. Putting aside the highly emotionally charged atmosphere, the Indiana
court of appeals in Trammell held that the condition was not reasonably related to the

1

State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 202-03 (Wis. 2001), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 74 (2002).

2

Id. at 217.

3

Trammell v. State, 751 N.E.2d 283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).

4

Id. at 285-86.

5

Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 203; Trammell, 751 N.E.2d at 286.

6

Carey v. Population Services Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 688-89 (1977); Arx v. Schwarz, 517
N.W.2d 540 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994).
7

Trammell, 751 N.E.2d at 291.
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probationary goals.8 In contrast, while utilizing a more deferential standard of
review, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the condition was reasonably
related to the goals to withstand constitutional analysis.9
In the fall of 2004, the Supreme Court of Ohio addressed this same issue in Ohio
v. Talty.10 The Talty court chose to strike down the antiprocreation restriction within
a deadbeat dad’s community control sanction, or probation order.11 However, the
Talty court’s approving language of State v. Oakley, where the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin upheld the antiprocreation restriction as a condition of probation,
fundamentally set the stage for Ohio to join the Oakley precedent in the future.
This Note discusses the constitutionality of antiprocreation restrictions as they
relate to the purposes and goals of probation, in the context of the Talty, Oakley, and
Trammell decisions. This Note addresses the ramifications and implications of these
restrictions in relation to the deadbeat parent crisis, and it proposes more adequate
means to accomplish the competing goals of child welfare and adherence to
constitutional doctrine.
Section II introduces and dissects the fundamental right to procreate as it is found
under two concepts: the right itself and the right to privacy. Section III discusses the
purposes of probation, generally, and articulates two leading ways state courts deal
with antiprocreation restrictions in probation sentences. Section IV provides the
factual and procedural backgrounds of Trammell, Oakley, and Talty. It further
provides a full analysis of the Oakley and Talty rationales. Section V discusses how
the Oakley and Talty courts respectively misapplied, expressly and impliedly, the
constitutional review of these probation conditions. Section VI sets forth the
ramifications and implications of Talty and Oakley. Section VII illustrates how the
Indiana case of Trammell v. State, where the appellate court used a “less restrictive
means” analysis, properly struck down an antiprocreation condition,12 and calls for a
nationwide adoption of a less restrictive means test. This section also makes the call
for, and proposes, more legislation that directly compensates the children involved in
these situations.
II. THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PROCREATE
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor once explained that “the Constitution is the
cornerstone of our nation’s commitment to principles of representative government
and majority rule,” while the Bill of Rights is clearly, and purposefully, an
antimajoritarian document.13 The Bill of Rights (the “Bill”) built a wall around
certain fundamental freedoms,14 which, theoretically, limits a majority’s ability to
intrude upon these freedoms.15 As originally adopted, the Bill’s purpose was to limit
8

See generally id. (discussing, throughout, the goals and purposes of probation).

9

See Oakley, 629 N.W. 2d 200.

10

State v. Talty, 814 N.E.2d 1201 (Ohio 2004).

11

Community control sanctions are the functional equivalent to probation. Id. at 1205.

12

Trammell, 751 N.E.2d at 289-90.

13

Sandra Day O’Connor, The Majesty of the Law 59 (Craig Joyce ed., 2004).

14

U.S. Const. amend. V.

15

O’CONNOR, supra note 13, at 59.
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the federal government’s abuse of power and to ensure the sovereignty of the states
in legislating in furtherance of the Bill of Rights’.16 Years later, Congress adopted
the Fourteenth Amendment, which requires the states to accord all citizens due
process and equal protection, similar to the Fifth Amendment’s protections.17
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments each provide that neither the federal nor
state governments shall deprive any person, “of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law.”18 This clause, the Due Process Clause, is interpreted as instituting
two separate limits on these governments, that of “procedural due process,” and that
of “substantive due process.”19
Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the government must follow
before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property.20 Substantive due process
poses the question of whether the government has an adequate reason for taking
away a person’s life, liberty, or property.21
The United States Supreme Court has consistently held the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporates most of the Bill’s protections, such as freedom of religion,
freedom of the press, and the right to privacy under the Amendment’s use of the
word “liberty.”22 Because of this incorporation, states, like the federal government,
cannot encroach upon these fundamental rights.23
Some rights, quite decidedly, were not expressly set forth in the Bill. The
Framers singled out only a small number of fundamental principles.24 The purpose
of this was to refrain from diminishing the significance and importance of the Bill
itself.25 Justice O’Connor explains that, “a laundry list of lesser rights, such as the
right to wear powdered wigs in public, would sit uneasily beside such fundamental
liberties as freedom of speech and religion.”26 The Court has historically adhered to
this belief and its converse that some rights are so implicit in the concept of liberty
that the Court must hold them to be fundamental, because one would never consider
the need to enumerate such a basic right.27 The Court, accordingly, offers them
16

Id.

17

Id.

18

U.S. CONST. amend. V and XIV.

19

Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies § 7.1 (2d ed. 2002).

20

Id.

21

Id.

22

See O’CONNOR, supra note 13, at 59.

23

Id.

24

Id.

25

Id. at 59-60.

26

Id.

27

Skinner v. Oklahoma, ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (finding the right to
procreate fundamental). Accord Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding constitutional
protection in reproductive autonomy); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (finding the right
to marriage fundamental); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding the right to
purchase contraceptives protected by the fundamental right to privacy).
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special protections during appellate review, via heightened scrutiny, under
substantive due process.28
A. The Right to Procreate
The Court originally rejected its current position that the right to procreate is
fundamental in Buck v. Bell, and it, accordingly, need not be offered heightened
protection by the courts.29 Here, the Court stated that it was perfectly constitutional
for the state of Virginia to involuntarily sterilize mentally retarded persons.30 The
state institutionalized the named plaintiff, Carrie Buck, an 18 year old woman.31
Justice Holmes, who delivered the opinion of the Court, described Carrie Buck as a
“feeble minded white woman.”32 The Justice went on to advocate the Court’s
position by explaining that, “[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough.”33
Arguably, the Court first recognized the right to procreate as a protected
fundamental right in the 1942 landmark decision of Skinner v. Oklahoma.34 There,
the Skinner Court declared the Oklahoma Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act
(OHCSA) unconstitutional. OHCSA allowed courts to order the sterilization of men
convicted two or more times for crimes of “moral turpitude.”35 Justice Douglas,
writing for the Court, stated, with urgency, the sensitive area sterilization statutes
invade – the basic human right to produce offspring.36 He explained, “[Procreation]
involves one of the basic civil rights of man. . . . Procreation [is] fundamental to the
very existence and survival of the race.”37 Justice Douglas’ strong language
emphasizes the fundamental nature of procreation, because of which the Court has
treated the right as fundamental in most, if not all, of its subsequent decisions.38
28

See generally supra note 27. Appellate courts review impingements on fundamental
rights by utilizing strict scrutiny. The United States Supreme Court, however, affords abortion
the slightly, less strict standard of review, “unduly burdensome,” even though abortion is still
regarded as a right held within the fundamental right to procreate. See generally Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
29

Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).

30

Id.

31

Id.

32

Buck, 274 U.S. at 205. In 1980, however, Carrie Buck was evaluated as a woman of
normal intelligence and was living with her sister, who had also been sterilized by the state.
See Stephen Jay Gould, Carrie Buck’s Daughter, 2 CONST. COMMENT. 331, 336 (1985).
33

Buck, 274 U.S. at 207.

34

316 U.S. 535 (1942). The United States Supreme Court overturned a sterilization statute
that applied to burglars but did not apply to embezzlers. The State convicted each class of
felons on the identical actus reus and mens reus elements. The Court found that the statute’s
classification violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, while
finding the right to procreate fundamental.
35

Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536-37.

36

Id. at 536.

37

Id. at 541.

38

E.g., Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding the right to an
abortion fundamental on the grounds that the right to procreate and not to procreate are
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B. The Right to Privacy
The fundamentality of the right to procreate gains further support by the Court’s
decisions in Griswold v. Connecticut39 and Eisenstadt v. Baird,40 which discuss
privacy rights. Although the United States Constitution does not explicitly mention
any right to privacy,41 the Court recognizes that a right of personal privacy, or a
guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, exists under the Constitution.42 In
varying contexts, the Court has found the roots of the right in the First Amendment,43
in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments,44 and in the concept of liberty guaranteed by
the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment.45
Specifically, the Griswold Court recognized the existence of penumbras, or,
“surrounding areas or periphery of uncertain extent,”46 which contain implied rights
within the guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights.47 Various guarantees found
within the Bill of Rights create zones of privacy.48 Without these elements, which
act as subparts to these guaranteed rights, substantive due process rights, and those
expressed in the Bill, have no foundation to stand upon.49 The Court, further, cited
the Ninth Amendment, which provides: “The enumeration in the Constitution, of

fundamental); Griswold, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding the right to contraception fundamental
because the right to procreation is fundamental). In Skinner, the Supreme Court holds the
right to procreate fundamental. However, the Court in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), held
sterilization of mentally retarded people constitutional. The distinction lies in that Justice
Douglas distinguishes between similarly situated inmates in Skinner, versus all mentally
retarded people in Buck.
39

381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding the ban of contraceptives to married persons as an
unconstitutional invasion of the right of privacy of married persons).
40

405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding a statute that prohibited the sale of contraceptives to
unmarried persons unconstitutional on equal protection grounds).
41
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973); see also Griswold, 381 U.S. 479 at 482
(noting that the First Amendment does not mention the right to educate a child in a school of
the parents’ choice, however it has been construed to include that right).
42

See Carey v. Population Servs., Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977); Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.

43

Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).

44

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51
(1967); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
45

See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); see also Roth v. Bd. of Regents, 408
U.S. 564, 572 (1972).
46

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 522 (2d pocket ed.) (2001).

47

Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-85 (holding the First, Third, Fourth and Fifth Amendments
are buttressed by penumbras like privacy). This approach, the “penumbra approach,” has been
treated as and is now analogous to a due process analysis. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, at §
10.3.2.
48

Griswold, 381 U.S. at 514.

49

See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, at § 10.3.2.
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certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people.”50
Griswold helped clarify that only personal rights can be deemed “fundamental,”
or “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”51 The decision also affirms that the
right to privacy has some extension to activities relating to marriage,52 procreation,53
contraception,54 family relationships,55 child rearing, and education.56
In Eisenstadt, the Court reaffirmed that personal privacy is a fundamental right
protected by the Constitution, and that the right to procreate falls under its
umbrella.57 The Eisenstadt Court held that, if the right to privacy means anything, it
means freedom from governmental intrusion into matters “so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision to bear or beget a child.”58
More recently, the Court explicated that the lower courts’ roles are not to
mandate any sort of “moral code” for the nation.59 Instead, the courts’ duties should
extend only to protect a person’s liberty.60 The Court recognizes that an aspect of
“liberty” protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is
this right to personal privacy in certain areas or zones.61 The right of personal
privacy includes “the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important
decisions.”62 The Court has not determined how far-reaching this right is or where
this right to personal privacy ends. That being said, it is certain that an individual
may make personal decisions, without unjustified government interference, “relating

50

Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. IX) (emphasis added).

51

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937)). It should be noted Justice Douglas avoided a substantive due process argument as the
basis of the Griswold decision. Professor Erwin Chemerinsky notes that this action was taken
in response to the Lochner era of the Court, which generally did not afford this somewhat
broader analysis. Today, the penumbral approach is treated as a substantive due process
analysis. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, at § 10.3.2.
52

Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding the right to marry fundamental).

53

Skinner v. Oklahoma, ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541-542 (1942) (holding the
right to procreate fundamental).
54
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972) (holding the right to contraception
fundamental).
55

Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).

56

Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer, 262 U.S. 390.

57

See generally Eisenstadt, 405 U.S 438.

58

Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (citations ommited).

59
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003); Casey, 505 U.S. at 850 (stating the United
States Supreme Court’s “obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate [its] own
moral code”).
60

See Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558, 571.

61

Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977).

62

Id.
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to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and
education.”63
III. PROBATION PARTICULARS
When government regulation significantly impinges on a fundamental right or
upon personal liberty, the state prevails only upon a showing of a subordinate,
compelling government interest.64 The Court established, however, that probationers
do not enjoy the same degree of freedom and liberty as those citizens who have not
broken the law.65 The commonly requisite strict scrutiny review in such cases,
therefore, is inapplicable.66 The Court, notably, has yet to establish a test or rule in
any matter as to what extent the government may infringe upon a probationer’s
fundamental rights.67
A. Probation: Purposes and Rationale
In lieu of jail time, a court may extend a probation agreement to the defendant.
Here, the probationer agrees to abide by a catalog of restrictions, called probation
conditions, in consideration for avoiding a prison term.68
Generally, the purpose of probation is two-fold: (1) to protect the public welfare
while the probationer is at large and (2) to facilitate rehabilitation for the offender.69
Trial courts utilize broad discretion when instituting probation conditions.70 At the
very least, these conditions, when restricting certain constitutional rights, must
reasonably relate to the probationary purposes and to the criminal activity itself.71

63

State v. Trammell, 751 N.E.2d 283, 290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting Carey, 431 U.S.
678 at 685).
64

See Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960).

65

See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974). Here, the United States Supreme Court
upheld a statute denying a felon, who served his complete sentence, the fundamental right to
vote. The Court recognized felons do not enjoy the same degree of liberty as non-felons.
66

See Elizabeth F. McCright, Prohibiting Deadbeat Dads from Fathering More Children . .
. What’s Next? The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s Decision in State v. Oakley, 86 MARQ. L.
REV. 153, 172 (2002). But see Devon A. Corneal, Note, Limiting the Right to Procreate: State
v. Oakley and the Need for Strict Scrutiny, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 447, 468 (2003).
67
See State v. Talty, 814 N.E.2d 1201 (Ohio 2004); Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 202-03; see
also Trammell, 751 N.E.2d 283; People v. Pointer, 151 Cal. 3d 1128 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
Each court applies a different appellate review where probation conditions impinge the
fundamental right to procreate.
68
LAURA DIETZ, 21A AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law §907 (2004). It should be noted that
courts disfavor challenges to probation agreements based upon contractual theory. However,
for the purposes of explaining probation’s purposes and rationales only, a contractual
metaphor defines the parties’ intents in a simple manner.
69

Id. See Trammell, 751 N.E.2d 283; see Pointer, 151 Cal. 3d 1128 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).

70

See 21A DIETZ, supra note 68. Wisconsin statutory law supports the proposition that
courts have broad discretion when instituting probation conditions. See Edwards v. State, 246
N.W.2d 109, 110-11 (Wis. 1978); State v. Garner, 194 N.W.2d 649, 651-52 (Wis. 1972).
71

Id. at 111-12. See Gordy v. State, N.E.2d 190 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).
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On review, conditions that the court finds to be vindictive, vague, overly broad, or
unreasonable will be stricken from the probation order.72
B. Constitutional Challenges to Probation Conditions, Tests Used by Courts
The general population usually perceives probation as a gift – the gift of not
serving a prison sentence. Under this rationale, known simply as the “Act of Grace
Doctrine,”73 a court treats probation as a privilege that the probationer should accept
thankfully, despite whatever constitutionally-held rights the conditions in the
probation order may infringe.74 In 1973, the United States Supreme Court explicitly
rejected this doctrine, explaining that “a probationer can no longer be denied due
process in reliance . . . that probation is an ‘act of grace.’”75
Since the demise of the Act of Grace Doctrine, courts in Wisconsin, Ohio and
numerous other states have held that probation conditions may impinge on
probationers’ fundamental rights, so long as the conditions are reasonably related to
the probationer’s rehabilitation and the public’s protection.76 This reasonableness
standard is the most deferential test used by an appellate court when reviewing a trial
court’s probation order. It requires only that the conditions must not be vague,
excessive or illegal.77
Notably, when a probation condition does impinge on a fundamental right, some
forward-thinking courts employ a more stringent review, or special scrutiny
standard.78 For example, the Indiana court of appeals in Trammell v. State79 utilized
this special scrutiny. The review entails balancing (1) the purpose sought to be
served by probation, (2) the extent to which constitutional rights enjoyed by law
abiding citizens should be afforded to probationers, and (3) the legitimate needs of
law enforcement.80 Even if these factors weigh in favor of the state, the state must
still demonstrate that no less intrusive means exist to accomplish these goals.81

72
See 21A DIETZ, supra note 68; see also Garrett v. State, 680 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. Ct. App.
1997); Kahn v. State, 700 So. 2d 767 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1997).
73

Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492-93 (1934).

74

Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).

75

Id. at 782.

76

See, e.g., United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144, 150 (5th Cir. 1979) (“[The] probation
condition is not necessarily invalid simply because it affects probationer’s ability to exercise
constitutionally protected rights”); State v. Talty, 814 N.E.2d 1201 (Ohio 2004); Smith v.
State 727 N.E.2d 763, 767 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (“The condition may impinge upon a
probationer’s exercise of an otherwise constitutionally protected right”); Edwards v. State, 246
N.W.2d 109, 111 (Wis. 1976) (“Conditions of probation may impinge upon constitutional
rights as long as they are not overly broad and are reasonably related to the person’s
rehabilitation”).
77

Corneal, supra note 66, at 465; see also 21A DIETZ, supra note 68.

78

See United States v. Consuelo-Gonazalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1975); Pointer,
151 Cal. 3d 1128; Trammell, 751 N.E.2d 283.
79
80

Trammell, 751 N.E.2d at 289.

Id. at 289. California courts use a slightly more stringent, narrowly tailored test. In
addressing the “reasonably related” prong, the court will invalidate a condition if it:
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IV. TRAMMELL, OAKLEY, AND TALTY: THE NATION’S THREE LEADING CASES
CONCERNING ANTIPROCREATION RESTRICTIONS
A. Trammel v. Indiana
On April 25, 1999, Kristie Trammell gave birth to a son, J.T.82 From the outset,
Trammell failed to take her son to multiple doctors appointments, including his twoweek check-up and his initial immunization appointment.83
Approximately six weeks before J.T.’s death, Trammell left the child in the care
of her mother, Carol Hatcher.84 While in Hatcher’s care, J.T. experienced vomiting
and suffered severe diarrhea. Hatcher testified at trial that Trammell’s older
daughter, S.P., experienced the same conditions as an infant and subsequently
underwent corrective esophageal surgery.85 Hatcher alerted Trammell to J.T.’s poor
condition, and Trammell told her mother she would make an appointment for her son
with his doctor, but never did.86 A few days later, according to Hatcher, J.T.’s eyes
“looked funny” and were “deep set into his head.”87
Just after midnight on September 20, 1999, Trammell returned home from
shopping. She fed J.T., who regurgitated most of his milk.88 Trammell put J.T. to
sleep. She looked into his room the next morning and saw J.T. lying in his
bassinet.89 Trammell left the house without feeding him and returned home around
3:30 p.m. She then left again to run various errands. She returned home and took
care of some matters concerning her daughter, and moved some outdoor plants
before checking on her son.90
J.T. had died at approximately 5:00 a.m. that morning from “emaciation,
dehydration and salt or electrolyte imbalance due to chronic malnutrition,” according
to forensic pathologist Dr. John Heidingsfelder, who also performed the autopsy.91

“(1) has no relationship to the crime which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to
conduct which is not itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not
reasonably related to future criminality. Furthermore, where a condition impinges on
a fundamental right, the court must determine whether the condition is impermissibly
overly broad.” Pointer, 151 Cal. 3d at 1139; see also People v. Dominguez, 256
Cal.App.2d 623, 627 (1967).
81

Trammell, 751 N.E.2d at 287.

82

Id. at 285.

83

Id.

84

Id.

85

Id.

86

Id.

87

Trammell, 751 N.E.2d at 286.

88

Id.

89

Id.

90

Id.

91

Id.
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The state of Indiana charged Trammell with child neglect of a dependent as a
Class B Felony.92 The trial court found Trammell guilty, but mentally ill due to
mental retardation, sentencing Trammel to eighteen years in prison. The trial court
determined Trammell would serve eight years of the prison sentence on probation.93
As a condition of the probation, the trial court ordered Trammell not to become
pregnant.94
Upon appeal of the antiprocreation condition, the Indiana court of appeals
vacated the probation order.95 Indiana appellate courts utilize a heightened scrutiny,
comparable to a less intrusive means standard, discussed in Section III(B), supra.
The Indiana court of appeals held that the existence of numerous less intrusive
means, which did not severely affect the right to procreate, rendered the probation
order invalid.96
B. Wisconsin v. Oakley
Arrears $25,000 in child support, David Oakley, the defendant in Wisconsin v.
Oakley, could not support his nine children.97 The state of Wisconsin charged him
with four counts of refusing to pay child support as a repeat offender, a felony in the
state of Wisconsin.98 Oakley pleaded “no contest” to the charges.99 The trial court
imposed both a three year prison sentence and five years probation following his
incarceration.100 The court ordered that, “[W]hile on probation, Oakley cannot have
any more children unless he demonstrates that he has the ability to support them and
that he is supporting the children he already has.”101 If Oakley did procreate, the

92

Trammell, 751 N.E.2d at 286

93

Id.

94

Id.

95

Trammell, 751 N.E.2d at 289.

96

Id.

97

State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 202 (Wis. 2001), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 74 (2002).
The Wisconsin Supreme Court found that, despite Oakley’s non-payment, his actions were
unintentional when considering relevant factors such as his unemployment, his drug addiction
problems and his status as a welfare recipient. The Court accepted Oakley’s statement that, if
he had the money, he would pay his outstanding debt to his children.
98

Id. at 204-05. The statutory sanction against non-payment of child support is defined as
a Class E felony for any person, “who intentionally fails for 120 or more consecutive days to
provide spousal, grandchild or child support which the person knows or reasonably should
know the person is legally obligated to provide . . . .” WIS. STAT. ANN. § 948.22(2) (West
2000). A Class E felony is punishable with “a fine not to exceed $10,000 or imprisonment not
to exceed 2 years, or both.” Id. at § 939.50(3)(e). The legislature has amended this statute so
that intentionally refusing to pay child support is now punishable by up to five years in prison.
See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.50(3)(e) (West Supp. 2001).
99

Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 206.

100
Id. at 203. The probation condition allowed Oakley to avoid a prison sentence totaling
eight years.
101

Id.
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state would incarcerate him.102 Upon appeal, both the Wisconsin court of appeals
and the Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the probation condition.103 The
Wisconsin Supreme Court, utilizing the less stringent reasonableness test, held that
the condition was not overly broad and was reasonably related to the probationary
goals.104
The majority in Oakley impliedly determined the procreation condition to be
reasonable based on the outdated Act of Grace doctrine (discussed supra, Section
III(B)). The Wisconsin court stated, “because Oakley was convicted of [a felony],
[he] could have been imprisoned for six years . . . this probation condition, which
infringes on his right to procreate during his term of probation, is not invalid under
these facts.”105 The Oakley court argued that Oakley, in contractual terms, got the
benefit of the bargain. The majority’s statement can hardly be distinguished from
the rationale that probation is a privilege that should be “thankfully accepted by the
probationer, despite whatever constitutionally held rights were infringed,”106 because
the act of granting probation is clearly a gift from this court.
The Oakley court further explained that antiprocreation restrictions survive
constitutional analysis because convicted individuals do not enjoy the same degree of
liberty as non-criminal citizens.107 Since criminals do not share the same “clean
slate” as non-criminals, probation conditions forced upon a probationer may impinge
upon his constitutional rights, so long as the conditions are not overly broad and are
reasonably related to the probationer’s rehabilitation.108

102

Id.

103

Id.

104

Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 206. Oakley argued that the condition infringed on his
fundamental right to procreate, therefore, the condition must be subject to a strict scrutiny
analysis. “That is, it must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” Oakley,
629 N.W. 2d at 207-08. On a national scale, the Oakley court adopted the standpoint of the
minority of jurisdictions. See United States v. Smith, 972 F.2d 960, 962 (8th Cir. 1992)
(procreation restriction imposed on defendant convicted of heroin possession invalid); Pointer,
199 Cal. Rptr. at 365 (procreation restriction imposed on defendant convicted of child
endangerment overly broad where less restrictive means existed to provide safety for
children); People v. Zaring, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263, 269 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (condition that
defendant convicted for heroin possession not become pregnant during probation invalid);
Howland v. State, 420 So. 2d 918, 919-20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (condition prohibiting
defendant from fathering a child not reasonably related to crime of child abuse where other
less restrictive means existed to protect future children); People v. Ferrell, 659 N.E.2d 992,
995 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (“no-pregnancy” condition for defendant convicted of battery of a
two-month-old child struck); State v. Trammell, 751 N.E.2d 283, 290-91 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)
(condition prohibiting defendant convicted of child neglect from becoming pregnant while on
probation violated the right of privacy).
105

Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 201-02.

106

Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492-93 (1935).

107

State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 207 (Wis. 2001); see also Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483
U.S. 868, 874 (1987).
108

Oakley, 629 N.W. at 210.
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The Oakley court concluded that the antiprocreation restriction did not
permanently eliminate the defendant’s ability to exercise his constitutional right, and
therefore, the condition was not overly broad.109 In contrast to Carrie Buck in Buck
v. Bell, once the term of the probation expired, Oakley retained the ability and
freedom to father more children. More importantly, Oakley could satisfy the
condition of probation by making efforts to support his children as required by
law.110 The Oakley court also held that the condition was reasonably related to the
goal of rehabilitation because it prevented the defendant from creating more victims,
should he continue to intentionally refuse to support his children.111
C. Ohio v. Talty
1. Historical and Procedural Backgrounds
On February 27, 2002, the state of Ohio indicted Sean E. Talty, an Akron
resident, on two counts of non-support of dependants in violation of O.R.C. §§
2929.21 and/or 2929.21(B),112 “a fourth degree felony, for unlawfully and recklessly
failing to provide adequate support for three of his seven children.”113 Talty initially
plead not guilty to the non-support charges, but later changed his plea to no
contest.114 The Medina County Court of Common Pleas accepted his plea, and found
him guilty of all of the counts charged in the indictment.115
Prior to sentencing, the presiding judge, Judge James L. Kimbler,116 ordered each
party to the action to submit briefs to determine “whether or not the Court can
lawfully order that, as a condition of [Talty’s] supervision by the Adult Probation
Department, [Talty] may not impregnate a woman while under supervision.”117 Each
party filed a brief in support of their position.118
After reviewing the arguments, the court held that it did in fact have the power to
institute such a restriction.119 Further, the court held that such a community control

109

Id. at 212; see also State v. Kline, 963 P.2d 697 (Ore. Ct. App. 1998).

110

Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 203.

111

Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 212.

112

Ohio v. Talty, No. 02CA0087-M, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 2907 (Ohio Ct. App., Medina
County June 18, 2003).
113

Id. at *2.

114

Id.

115

Id.

116

Robert. E. Pierre, In Ohio, Supreme Court Considers Right to Procreate, WASH. POST,
May 11, 2004, at A02.
117

Talty, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 2907, at *2.

118

Id. at *2. The America Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Ohio, upon motion to
intervene, also submitted a brief as amicus curiae. The ACLU argued that the trial court did
not have the authority to impose such a restriction as a term of probation on the fundamental
right to procreate. Id. at *2-3.
119

Id.
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sanction, a form of probation,120 was consistent with the purposes of probation, as
dictated by O.R.C. § 2929.11(A),121 and sentenced Talty to community control for
five years under the general supervision of the Adult Probation Department.122
Judge Kimbler ordered Talty:
1) to make regular payments of $75 a week for each case he maintained
with to the Medina County Child Support Enforcement Agency; 2) to
make all reasonable efforts to remain employed on a fulltime basis; 3) to
obtain a GED within five years; 4) to make all reasonable efforts to avoid
conceiving another child while under the supervision of the Medina
County Adult Probation Department.123
In Ohio, community control sentences operate as the functional equivalent to
probation sentences.124 As long as it is not required by the court to do otherwise, the
trial court may impose a sentence on a felonious offender that consists of one or
more of these community control sanctions.125 Such sanctions, like probation
conditions, include stipulations such as the offender must abide by the law, and must
not leave the state without the permission of the court or the offender’s probation
officer.126 The court can also impose any other condition under a community control
sanction that the court considers “appropriate.”127
Like the majority of states, Ohio’s laws dictate that the trial court retains broad
discretion in determining the conditions of a probation order.128 However, the trial
court may not impose any arbitrary conditions, which in purpose or in effect, burden

120
Id. at *3. Community control is the functional equivalent to probation. Id. at *9. A
“community control sanction” is defined by Ohio Revised Code § 2929.01(F) (West 2003) as
a sanction that is not a prison term and is described in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.15(West
2003) (community control), OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.16 (West 2003) (residential
sanction), OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.17 (West 2003) (nonresidential sanctions) or OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.18 (West 2003) (financial sanctions; restitution). Talty, 2003 Ohio
App. LEXIS 2907, at *3, n.2.
121

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.11(A) (West 2003). This statute defines the purposes of
felony sentencing as, “the overriding purposes of felony sentencing are to protect the public
from future crime by the offender and others and to punish the offender. To achieve those
purposes, the sentencing court shall consider the need for incapacitating the offender, deterring
the offender and others from future crime, rehabilitating the offender, and making restitution
to the victim of the offense, the public, or both.”
122

Talty, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 2907, at *3.

123

Id.

124

Id. at *9.

125
Id. (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.15(A)(1)); see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2929.16; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.17; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.18.
126

Talty, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 2907, at *9-10.

127

Id. at *10. See State v. Sturgeon, 742 N.E.2d 730, 733 (Ohio 2000).

128

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2951.02; Lakewood v. Hartman, 714 N.E. 2d 902, 904 (Ohio
1999); State v. Jones, 550 N.E.2d 469, 470 (Ohio 1990).
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the defendant in the exercise of his or her liberty.129 Ohio case law defines
“arbitrary” as “bearing only a remote relationship to the crime for which [defendant]
was convicted and to the objectives sought by probation of education and
rehabilitation.”130 Similarly to Wisconsin’s doctrine, when the trial court invokes a
probation sentence, it, therefore, may not be so overly broad as to unnecessarily
infringe on the constitutional rights of the probationer.131 Talty appealed the
antiprocreation restriction; however, the Ohio court of appeals upheld the
condition.132
Upon review, Ohio appellate courts currently utilize a “reasonableness” standard,
or the Jones test, to determine whether a trial court’s probation order and its
conditions should be upheld.133 The Supreme Court of Ohio, in State v. Jones,134 set
fourth a three-part test to determine whether a probation condition is sufficiently
related to the interests of doing justice, rehabilitating the offender, and ensuring the
offender’s good behavior.135
Under Jones, courts should consider each of the following: (1) whether the
condition is reasonably related to the rehabilitating the offender, (2) whether the
condition has some relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted,
and (3) whether the condition relates to the conduct which is criminal or reasonably
related to future criminality and serves the statutory ends of the probation.136
Notably, although community control sanctions are not exactly the same as
probation,137 the trial court’s authority – as it is with probation – is not limitless and
those conditions may not be overly broad as to impinge upon the offender’s
liberty.138
Utilizing the Jones test,139 the Ohio court of appeals found that the reasonableness
standard governs the validity of the community control sanction.140 Even though the
issue involves a fundamental right, the court of appeals held that, because Talty was
a felon, he was not entitled to the heightened scrutiny.141
129

Talty, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 2907, at *7-8 (citing State v. Livingston, 372 N.E.2d
1335, 1336 (Ohio Ct. App., 1976)).
130

Livingston, 372 N.E.2d 1335, 1337 (Ohio Ct. App., 1976).

131

State v. Maynard, 547 N.E.2d 409, 411 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988).

132

See generally Talty, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 2907.

133

Livingston, 372 N.E.2d at 1337.

134

State v. Jones, 550 N.E.2d 469, 470 (Ohio 1990).

135

Id.

136

Talty, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 290, at *8-9.

137

Talty, 814 N.E.2d 1201 (Ohio 2004). See State v. Lake, 781 N.E.2d 1053, 1056 (Ohio
Ct. App., 2002) (citing State v. Jahnke, 772 N.E.2d 156 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002)).
138

State v. Jahnke, 772 N.E.2d 156, 158 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002).

139

Jones, 550 N.E.2d at 470.

140

Talty, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 290, at *27.

141

See generally Talty, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 290. See supra Section III (discussing the
limited rights of probationerss).
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The Ohio Supreme Court agreed that the Jones test governed this type of review,
but the court struck down the appellate court’s holding.142 The court found that the
condition was overly broad under Jones, and accordingly it vacated that portion of
the trial court’s community control sanctions.143
2. Application of Jones
The Ohio Supreme Court in Talty chose not to address the constitutionality of the
antiprocreation restriction in the probation order, saying only that the court will not
reach constitutional issues unless absolutely necessary.144 Instead, the court focused
only on the non-constitutional argument: whether the sanctions met the Jones test.145
In its opinion, the Talty court dispensed of the out-of-date “act of grace” doctrine,
which the Wisconsin Supreme Court relied upon heavily. The court did agree that
probationers do not enjoy the same liberties and freedom as those not convicted of
breaking the law.146 However, the Ohio Supreme Court reiterated that the fact that
the state might have incarcerated Talty does not, in itself, justify an intrusion upon
his or her rights.147
The Talty court’s rejection of the “Act of Grace Doctrine” rests on the undisputed
proposition that infringements on constitutional rights must be tailored to meet
specific government interests.148 These interests differ depending on whether the
defendant is incarcerated or subject to community control sanctions.149
The Talty court used the example of a person incarcerated for a crime wholly
unrelated to procreation — burglary — who is denied conjugal visits.150 This is
arguably an infringement on this person’s right to procreate; however, the regulation
keeping a person who otherwise would not be at the prisonis reasonably related to
the legitimate state interest of maintaining the security of the prison.151 On the other
hand, for the same crime of burglary, a probationer may not be denied the right to
procreate based on that same government interest (prison security), because the
reality is that probationers are free from restraint like non-probationers. A legitimate
government interest, in this situation, does not exist.

142

Talty, 814 N.E.2d at 1202.

143

Id.

144

Id. at 1203. See In re Miller, 585 N.E.2d 396, 405 (Ohio 1992); Hall China Co. v. Pub.
Util. Comm., 364 N.E.2d 852, 854 (Ohio 1977).
145

Id.

146

Id.

147

Talty, 814 N.E.2d at 1206 (citing United States v. Tolla, 781 F.2d 29, 33 (2d Cir. 1986);
United States v. Pastore, 537 F.2d 675, 681 (2d Cir. 1970); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778,
782 (1973).
148

Talty, 814 N.E.2d at 1206.

149

Id.

150

Id.

151

Id.; see also Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 137 (2nd Cir. 1994); Goodwin v.
Turner, 908 F.2d 1395, 1398 (8th Cir. 1990).
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Summarily, it follows for the Ohio Supreme Court that a legitimate penological
interest may be different from a legitimate probationary interest.152 The government
would make an unwise and erroneous conclusion that it may withhold any right from
a probationer simply because the court could have imprisoned the probationer.153
Second, the court analyzed the antiprocreation restriction under its Jones
reasonability standard. If a probation condition or community control sanction can
not meet the three-part Jones test, the condition unnecessarily infringes on the
probationer’s liberty, and the condition is deemed overly broad.154 The overly broad
threshold, therefore, determines the reasonableness of the condition.155
The availability of readily apparent alternatives to the regulation demonstrates
this “unreasonableness.”156
However, in Talty, the court noted that this
unreasonableness standard is not the functional equivalent of a “least restrictive
alternative” test.157 Courts need not summon and exhaust every conceivable,
alternative method to accommodate an offender’s constitutional complaint.158
Rather, the test is this: if the probationer himself devises a scheme in which the court
can meet the purpose of the probation order without infringing on the probationer’s
fundamental rights, the trial court arbitrarily infringed on those rights.159
Thus, the Talty court found that Jones stands for the proposition that probation
conditions must be reasonably related to the statutory ends of probation and must not
be overly broad.160 Since community control sanctions act as the functional
equivalent to probation, the Jones test applies in this case with equal force.161
Under the Jones analysis, Talty asserted that the Ohio Supreme Court should
strike down the procreation restriction in the community control sanction because it
did not provide an opportunity for the condition to be lifted if he fulfilled his child

152

Talty, 814 N.E.2d at 1206.

153

Id.

154

Talty, 814 N.E.2d. at1204. See State v. Jones, 550 N.E.2d 469, 470 (Ohio 1990). Other
jurisdictions have recognized the same proposition. See, e.g., Hughes v. State, 667 So. 910,
912 (Fla. Ct. App., 1996) (asserting that the trial court may not impose conditions of probation
that are “overbroad and can be violated unintentionally”); Williams v. State, 661 So.2d 59, 61
(Fla. Ct. App., 1995) (stating that the trial court may not “impose conditions of probation
which are overbroad”); State v. Friberg, 435 N.W.2d 509, 515 (Minn. 1989) (noting that
probation not only must be reasonably related to the purposes of sentencing, but must not be
“unduly restrictive of the probationer's liberty or autonomy”).
155

Talty, 814 N.E.2d at 1204. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90-91 (1987).

156

Turner, 482 U.S. at 90.

157

Talty, 814 N.E.2d at 1204 (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 90-91).

158

See Talty, 814 N.E.2d at 1204-05 (emphasis added); see also Turner, 482 U.S. at 90-91.

159

The Ohio Supreme Court states, “[b]ut if an [offender] can point to an alternative that
fully accommodates the prisoner’s rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests, a
court may consider that as evidence that the regulation does not satisfy the reasonable
relationship standard.” Talty, 814 N.E.2d at 1204-1205 (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 91).
160

Talty, 814 N.E.2d at 1205.

161

Id.
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support obligations. Talty argued, therefore, that the condition was overbroad.162
The State of Ohio, conversely, cited Wisconsin v. Oakley163 as authority supporting
its argument that the condition placed on Talty was reasonable.
The Ohio Supreme Court turned the State’s argument around, using Oakley for
the purpose of proving the condition was overly broad because it lacked a
mechanism to release the condition, or a time constraint.164 The court stated that,
based on the altered scenario that the time constraint had been part of Talty’s
sanctions, the court would not at this time determine the condition’s validity. The
court impliedly embraces, however, the anti-procreation concept by stating, “such a
mechanism would have been, at the very least, an easy alternative [better]
accommodating Talty’s procreation rights at de minimis costs to the legislative
interests.”165 The court implied, therefore, that such a mechanism would likely make
the restriction valid. To the court, this accommodation tallies up to a lower cost to
the legitimate probationary interests of rehabilitation and avoidance of future
criminality.166
V. ANALYSIS: TOGETHER, OAKLEY AND TALTY SET THE WRONG PRECEDENT
A. Oakley’s Approval of Overly Broad Conditions
The Oakley court made a few fatal errors in determining that the antiprocreation
imposed on Oakley – that he could not sire any more children until he demonstrates
he can provide for his current and future children – was reasonably related to the
statutory goals of rehabilitation of the defendant.
In Oakley, the state of Wisconsin chose to grant Oakley probation, and with that
he retained a significant amount of privacy as compared to imprisoned felons. While
the state chose not to exercise control over Oakley’s body by depriving him his
freedom from restraint — or imprisonment, it does not follow that the state may
automatically opt to exercise unlimited control over his right to procreate and his
right to privacy.167
The Oakley court made a crucial error in the application of the reasonableness
test. The Oakley court held, under this analysis, that impinging a probationer’s
fundamental right is lawful so long as the impinging condition is not overly broad.168
However, the court ignored issues like the condition’s enforcement and the
condition’s effects on future partners of Oakley (discussed infra, Section VI). The
court held the probation condition valid because the order allocates time restrictions

162

Id.

163

Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 202-03.

164

Talty, 814 N.E.2d at 1205.

165

Id.

166

Id.

167

Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 216 (Bradley, J., dissenting). All three female justices of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court dissented in the Oakley opinion.
168

Id. at 210 (quoting Edwards, 246 N.W.2d 109).
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to the condition.169 While time limits are indicative of a narrowly tailored test, the
Oakley court should not have held this single element determinative.170 Instead, the
court should have addressed all of the readily apparent implications of the
procreation restriction.171
The condition is overly broad in other ways. The Oakley court fails to
acknowledge its own findings: Oakley did not have the means, nor would he ever
likely have the means, to support his children.172 Effectually, if the court’s findings
are true, the court extinguished his right to procreate. Further, the Oakley court
failed to state what amount of money would be sufficient to fulfill the condition, only
reciting that Oakley fulfills the condition when he “has demonstrated”173 he can
support his current and future children.174 The court should not validate such a vague
standard.175
The Oakley majority further asserts that the procreation restriction is reasonably
related to Oakley’s rehabilitation because it prevents Oakley from creating more
victims should he continue not paying child support.176 Since the birth of his next
child triggers the probation condition, Oakley’s “rehabilitation” commences only
when he fathers more children, or breaks the law.177 Nothing in the court’s reasoning
illustrates how the probation condition will actually rehabilitates Oakley if he does
not sire another child. The condition does not, for example, teach Oakley how to
sustain employment or master a way to support the other victims, his current
children.
B. Talty’s Misapplication of Jones
Employing the Oakley court’s reasoning, the Talty court strikes down the
community control sanction against Talty based on the fact that the condition
169
Id. at 212. The Wisconsin Supreme Court pointed out that the probation condition
ceases once Oakley demonstrates he can support his current and future children; or, the
condition ceases when the five year probation period expires. Id.
170

Cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). The United States Supreme Court found
time limits for affirmative action cases to be a necessary element of a narrowly tailored
education program. The Court also found other elements, such as a complete look at a
student’s diversity character, rather than a cursory look at skin color, necessary for a valid
program. Consideration of just one of these factors does not transform the program into a
narrowly tailored one. While the Court has not applied the measures necessary for a valid
education affirmative action program to other law that requires an appellate court to use strict
scrutiny on review, like procreation infringements, it provides an analogous baseline; see also
Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (Powell, J., writing for the
plurality of the Court).
171

Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 216.

172

Id. at 217.

173

Id. at 203.

174

Id.

175

See 21A DIETZ, supra note 68.

176

Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 213.

177

Id. at 217 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
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contained no escape hatch, the time constraint.178 The Talty court only takes time to
ponder, “What if Mr. Talty could pay his obligations? How would the restriction
end?”
The Talty court expressly notes the trial court’s decision, to place the
antiprocreation restriction on Talty, stemmed from the trial court’s desire to help
Talty avoid future violations of the same law.179 The Ohio Supreme Court goes as
far as to say that this goal is valid, though overly broad because the condition lacks
an “out.”180 Although this court states it does not consider whether the escape
mechanism renders the condition valid under Jones, the court’s emphasis on Oakley
certainly leans in the direction that it would.181
Furthermore, the Talty court impliedly enunciates that a time-restrictive condition
is valid under Jones by failing to address the remaining Jones factors.182 The court
lost an opportunity to address the real matters at the heart of the case: the
constitutionality of the condition, the rehabilitative character of probation, and
whether a “less intrusive means” test is better suited for situations when a
fundamental right is at stake.183
Under Jones, the first issue a court addresses is whether the sanction or
restriction is reasonably related to rehabilitating the offender.184 Clearly, the ban on
procreation is not. While the production of future victims is arguably halted
(discussed infra Section VI), nothing in the restriction aids Talty. The condition
does not help Talty find steady employment or teach him parenting skills. It does
not make him a more productive citizen and a supportive father. The restriction only
accomplishes cutting off a person’s fundamental right to procreate and right to
personal privacy as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.185
Second in the Jones analysis, the condition must have some relationship to the
crime committed by the probationer.186 This is perhaps the only prong of Jones that
is fulfilled, though an exceedingly attenuated relationship exists, at best. Talty’s
children do not receive monetary support from him, which is a crime in Ohio.187 The
condition in the sanction states that Talty cannot sire any more children.188 The only
nexus that exists is that the crime and the condition involve children and Talty.
However, no nexus exists between Talty siring more children and Talty providing
proper support for his current children. The court cannot say with any certainty that
178

State v. Talty, 814 N.E.2d 1201, 1205 (Ohio 2004).

179

Id.

180

Id.

181

Id.

182

Id. at 1206-07.

183

Talty, 814 N.E.2d at 1210 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).

184

Talty, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 2907, at *8-9 (citing Jones, 550 N.E.2d at 470-71).

185

Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977).

186

Talty, 814 N.E.2d at 1207.

187

Talty, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 2907, at *1-2.

188

Id.
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Talty would provide the same support to each of his children; or that personal
factors, like marriage to another woman or a stronger father-child bond, would not
affect his disposition of support to his future children versus his current children.
Lastly, under Jones, the condition must relate to the charged conduct that is
criminal or reasonably related to future criminality, serving the statutory ends of the
probation.189 The statutory ends of probation are doing justice, rehabilitating the
offender, and insuring the offender’s good behavior.190 Placing a ban on a person’s
right to procreate in no way serves justice, as none of the actual problems, like
education of the probationer and payment to the probationer’s current children, are
met. At most, this restriction offends justice and the long precedent set by the United
States Supreme Court.191
Moreover, the Talty court points to constitutional doctrine that defines
reasonableness as a “burden that fully accommodates the probationer’s rights at a de
minimis cost to valid penological interests.”192 The court specifically notes that if the
probationer himself can point to a less intrusive mean to achieve the statutory ends of
the probation, the court may take that as evidence of an overly broad condition.193
Under this rationale, no procreation ban survives review, because almost any
probationer can list less intrusive means that do not offend his liberty interests while
serving the penological interests, doing justice, rehabilitating the offender, and
insuring the offender’s good behavior.194 Education, counseling, and work release
programs facilitate rehabilitation at a lower cost to the probationer’s liberty interest
than those endorsed by the Wisconsin and Ohio Supreme Courts. Talty’s
antiprocreation condition bears only a remote relationship to the crime for which the
State convicted him and to the objectives sought by probation and rehabilitation.
Jones explicitly forbids this remote relationship.195
VI. RAMIFICATIONS OF PROCREATION RESTRICTIONS AS PROBATION CONDITIONS
Apart from the constitutional impingements these antiprocreation restrictions
support, for many persons who disagree with the Oakley-Talty rationales, the
question whether the condition is really that bad remains. If your answer is, “no,”
the reason for this acquiescence likely hinges on the notion that the antiprocreation
condition ends the production of more victims. Unfortunately, this is not true.
A. Forced Sacrifice of One Liberty Interest for Another
The government must provide due process, both procedural and substantive,
when there has been a deprivation of liberty.196 Until recently, the United States
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196

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, at § 7.3.

162

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 19:141

Supreme Court narrowly defined “liberty.”197 Today, the Court has avoided
explicitly defining “liberty” as found in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments;
however, it has attempted clarifying its meaning.198 In Roth v. Board of Regents, the
Court stated:
The term denotes not only freedom from bodily restraint but also the right
of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations
of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring
up children, . . . and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized . .
. as essential to the orderly pursuit . . . . In a Constitution for a free
people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of “liberty” must be broad
indeed.199
Roth and the precedents set by Griswold and Eisenstadt clearly indicate that the
definition of “liberty” includes not only those rights that are expressly stated in
textual context, but also those that are not, such as the right to procreate.
As noted in Sections IV and V, the Oakley and Talty courts posited a choice to
their respective probationers: sacrifice their rights to procreate for their freedom of
restraint, or retain their rights to procreate and sacrifice their freedom from restraint.
Such a choice is an example of the “unconstitutional conditions doctrine.”200 This
doctrine, well established in law and in scholarship pertaining to constitutional law,
prohibits the government from conditioning a privilege on the requirement that a
person give up a constitutional right.201
If one accepts the faulty Oakley perception that probation, or freedom from
restraint in this context, is a privilege granted by the state,202 it must therefore follow
that a person should not be forced to sacrifice his right to procreate for probation. To
do so would impermissibly condition a privilege, probation, on the relinquishment of
a constitutional right, procreation.203 Because the Supreme Court has yet to address
the extent to which a state may impinge on a probationer’s fundamental rights,204 the
constitutionality of this sacrifice also remains questionable.
Notably, in most cases involving restrictions of a probationer’s rights, the actual
sacrifice of that right is not, in contractual terms, the “consideration” for the
197
See McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517 (1992) (holding that a liberty interest
exists only if a right existed. A privilege, granted by the government, at one time was not a
basis for requiring due process) (emphasis is added). Contra Roth, 408 U.S. at 472.
198
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Timothy C. Layton, Welfare for Lobbyists or Nonprofit Gag Rule: Can Congress Limit
a Federal Grant Recipient’s Use of Private Funds for Political Advocacy?, 47 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 1065, 1069 (1997) (citing Kathleen Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1413, 1414-1416, (1989)).
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“bargain.” For example, in some states, probationers, as a condition of their
probation, indefinitely lose their rights to vote.205 The Court has upheld that
condition’s constitutionality.206 The distinction between the voting cases and
Oakley-Talty may be subtle, but devastating in its effects. Simplistically, these
courts are telling the probationer, “You may go free so long as a child is not born. If
you cannot agree to this, or if a child is born, you will return to prison.” In the
voting cases, the courts are telling the probationer, “You can go free but you may not
vote.” The latter restriction does not invade an autonomic right, personal to human
beings; nor has the probationer been asked to sacrifice one right for another. Further,
procreation involves one of the basic civil rights of man, fundamental to the very
existence of the race. Voting, while an indelible and vitally imperative right of
citizens of the United States, is not.
B. The Practical Impact of an Impractical Punishment
1. Enforcement of the Decision against Male and Female Probationers
Had the Talty condition contained a time restraint (hereinafter “revised
condition”), the state of Ohio could not enforce or regulate the revised condition.
The probation condition sends Talty to prison the moment he sires another child.
Two problems arise from this decision: general enforcement and an issue of fairness.
First, no state has the means to prevent a probationer from engaging in sexual
intercourse; nor can a state ensure that a probationer will take all of the necessary
steps to prevent conception, and that those steps are 100 percent effective. In
striking down a similar antiprocreation condition of a man convicted on federal drug
charges, the Federal Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit properly explained that,
“short of having a probation officer follow [Defendant] twenty-four hours a day,
there is no way to prevent [him] from having more children.”207
Second, if a male probationer sires another child during the probation term, the
state, possibly, will not know of the violation. If a woman probationer is subject to
such a condition, her violation inevitably becomes apparent to that state because, at
some point, her pregnancy will be visible.208 Thus, an unfair advantage in the sphere
of enforcement exists in favor.
Under the female probationer scenario, if a court convicts a woman of nonpayment of child support and subjects her to the same probation condition as the
Talty revised condition, the state provides her with two choices: (1) have an abortion
to avoid jail time; or (2) have the child and go to prison. Few can conceptualize a
larger burden than having one’s choice to parent a child rest on that person’s
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Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
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Vivian Berger, Bedroom Sentence, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 17, 2001, at A1. Also, the United
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adults. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). The right to liberty, specifically privacy,
ensures this. Id.
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willingness to face a prison sentence.209 While it has been duly noted that
probationers do not enjoy the same liberty as non-criminals,210 it is utterly doubtful
that the United States Supreme Court wishes to endorse the result of this state action:
coercive abortion.211 The Supreme Court holds abortion to be unique and “[the] most
intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime.”212 Clearly, state
action does not belong in this realm of privacy.
2. The Effects on Male Probationers’ Female Partners is Unduly Burdensome
Matters that concern the intimate choices of people lie at the core of personal
dignity and at the center of the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.213
The Supreme Court holds that women’s liberty interests are unique to both the
human condition and the law,214 and that states must be extremely careful not to
cause additional personal suffering when attempting to regulate abortion.215 The
right to privacy supports the notion of women’s liberty because it “involves personal
decisions concerning not only the meaning of procreation but also human
responsibility and respect for it.”216
Like a penny, the right to procreate is two-sided. A woman retains the choice to
procreate and a choice not to procreate. The Court holds that the government enjoys
no legitimate interest in a fetus until it reaches the point of viability.217 Prior to that
point, the state cannot impose legislation that unduly burdens her decision.218 The
Oakley decision and the Talty revised condition ignore the Court’s precedent.
209

See id. While this Note’s scope excludes a full analysis as to whether a male or female
probationer suffers more, it is recognized, both legally and logically, that making this choice,
as a female probationer, involves different factors due to mere biology; see also Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992). The Casey Court stated, “the liberty of the
woman is at stake in a sense unique to the human condition . . . . The destiny of the woman
must be shaped in a large extent on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives”; see also
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding the restriction on abortion impinges the woman’s
right to privacy and her choices in regards to her personal autonomy).
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Courts upholding antiprocreation restrictions in probation orders of deadbeat
dads largely disregard the effects such a condition places on a probationer’s
partner.219 A probationer’s partner’s procreation rights, logically, are directly linked
to the probationer.220 Notwithstanding the fact that the partner’s constitutional rights
are predicated on a man’s felonious behavior, the “no further children” requirement
creates a hostile environment.221
A state regulation may be found to be an undue burden on a woman’s decision not
to procreate, and therefore her right to procreate, if it places a substantial obstacle in the
path of a woman who seeks an abortion.222 Although parental consent laws and
informed consent laws do not constitute an undue burden,223 other regulations that
entail an increase in risk of death or serious injury to the woman are found to create a
“substantial obstacle.”224 However, the state action must amount to more than just an
inconvenience.225
Because the trigger of the Oakley condition and Talty revised condition is the
birth of another child, the risk of imprisonment creates strong motivation for a man
in Talty’s or Oakley’s positions to demand a woman to terminate her pregnancy, or
worse, fall victim to deadly, domestic violence.226 This regulation clearly entails an
increased risk of death or serious injury; accordingly, it unduly burdens the partner’s
right to choose to have the child.227 By advocating these probation conditions, the
Oakley and Talty courts clearly contradict the Supreme Court’s handling of the right
to procreate since the inception of Roe v. Wade and its progeny.228
3. Child Support Possibilities Eliminated for the Current Children
If the State of Ohio sends Talty to prison for fathering another child, his other
children ultimately suffer. These antiprocreation restrictions, by themselves, do
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little, if anything, to further the support interests of any child. Combined with the
fact that the entire community control sanction in Talty ordered Talty to make
regular payments of $75 a week to the Medina County Child Support Enforcement
Agency,229 the revised condition becomes redundant and unnecessary.230
The states’ imprisonment of these probationers prevents the probationers from
meaningful involvement in their children’s lives, which may victimize the children
far more than any of the probationers’ actions.231 The trial courts in Talty and Oakley
sought to avoid the further victimization of the children.232 By imposing a redundant
and non-rehabilitative condition, however, the trial courts set the probationer up for
failure.233 By not examining the ramifications of the condition, the courts have
created a tool that operates in the exact opposite manner than intended — not only is
the chance of monetary support stripped from the children, but the opportunity for
emotional support is as well.
C. The Societal Implications of Antiprocreation Restrictions
1. Criminality for Impoverished Parents
The birth of a child is now a crime in the United States. In the opening
statements of the dissenting opinion in Oakley,234 Justice Bradley makes vehemently
clear that “the majority’s decision allows, for the first time in our state’s history, the
birth of a child to carry criminal sanctions.”235 The Talty court stepped into the same
line as the Oakley precedent by grandly stating that the restriction needed only a time
release mechanism.236
The Oakley court justified its position that the antiprocreation conditions were
valid by stating that the conditions stop the production of more victims.237 This is
not true. Even if the probationer uses contraception, birth control methods are not
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100 percent reliable.238 If the probationer used reasonable care and the protection
failed, ultimately resulting in the birth of a child, that child will carry the stigma of
knowing its birth sent its father or mother to prison.239
Furthermore, the financial status of a probationer may dictate the likelihood of
future parenthood, as wealth now becomes a prerequisite to parenthood. As a
growing trend, courts are increasingly punitive towards fathers who do not pay child
support.240 The courts’ views of this “irresponsibility” take three forms: (1) they
bring into the world illegitimate children they do not intend to support; (2) they leave
marriages they should remain in; and (3) they fail to pay child support.241 The courts
use this perceived “irresponsibility” to justify increasingly punitive measures against
non-custodial parents.242
One way the state can affect the “immorality” of such non-custodial parents is to
restrict their fundamental rights to procreate.243 Applying this rationale, states may
use this as justification to restrict the fundamental rights of the poor. For example,
Talty’s attorney stated to the press that if Talty were a man of means, he would have
paid the support; his attorney explained that Talty did not have any money and that
he was supporting his children to the best of his ability.244 The trial court, appellate
court, and the Ohio Supreme Court did not dispute this conclusion.245 In fact, Wade
F. Horn, assistant secretary for children and families at the United States Department
of Health and Human Services, recognizes that not everyone who owes money is a
deadbeat dad, and that “some people just don’t have the money.” However, in the
narrow, overprivileged views of these courts, low-income families become less
deserving of parenthood, justifying further unconstitutional restrictions on their
fundamental rights.246
The revised condition in Talty offers a brightline rule that few courts could
misapply. And, like many simplistic solutions, the ramifications and effects of the
solution devalue the ease of its application. By granting the state the power to decide
238
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who has the right to have children, it bases its decision on an individual’s financial
status.247 If a court can eliminate a person’s right to have a child solely on the
grounds of non-payment of child support, what is to say the court could not eliminate
someone’s right to have a child on account of poverty? The Oakley-Talty precedents
do so by lumping together fathers who simply cannot pay with fathers who refuse to
pay. The distinction may be subtle, and in some cases nearly difficult to distinguish,
but it is absolutely crucial to identify.
The courts of the United States, moreover, have never rationed the right to have a
child on the basis of wealth.248 Americans are free to have as many children as
desire.249 They may do so without the means to support their children, and then face
the legal consequences resulting from their inability to provide for them.250 This
fundamentally precious right is “at the very heart of [a] cluster of constitutionally
protected choices.”251 Bending the right in this manner only adds confusion and
injustice to the lives of those living in poverty.
2. Buck v. Bell Rears its Ugly Head
The newest, most taxing infringement on procreation rights is “pay-up or submit
to surgery.” Some legal scholars tout the latest affront on the right to procreate as an
aftershock of the Oakley decision.252 In Kentucky, Campbell County Judge Michael
“Mickey” Foellger gave at least seven men the choice of serving a civil contempt
order for refusing to pay child support or having a vasectomy.253 Judge Foellger
believes his orders lie within legal bounds because he does not specifically order any
of the men to have the procedure.254 Instead, Judge Foellger offers a vasectomy as an
“option” in certain civil contempt cases.255 For example, if a man has four or more
children, by three or more women, and he is at least $10,000 arrears in child support
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payments, the man might be allowed to undergo a vasectomy rather than spend up to
six months in jail.256
Judge Foellger’s court has kept each of the cases confidential.257 But, according
to the Judge, six men have accepted this offer since he became Campbell County’s
first and only family court judge in January of 2003.258 Only one father opted for a
prison term.259
Judge Foellger contends: “Most of the men have shown some relief when they
are offered something they should have thought of themselves. . . . These are the
type of people who live on spontaneity. They just float through life irresponsibly.”260
Judge Foellger sets standards for these men based on his own morality. It is not the
purpose or role of the courts, however, to do so.261 Instead, the Supreme Court
maintains that it is the courts’ duty to protect a person’s liberty.262
Furthermore, Judge Foellger clearly abdicates the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine. Here the court asks the defendant to sacrifice his personal autonomy for his
freedom from restraint. There is no difference between this and “sacrifice your right
to procreate for your freedom from restraint,” as explained in Section VI(A).
Judge Foellger, in contrast, argues that the imposition of this choice educates the
public that having a child is a responsibility, and therefore the choice itself is
appropriate.263 However, communicating to parents that they should take their duties
more seriously does not justify manipulating a person’s procreation right as a
personal service announcement. Judge Foellger has failed to explain how this
invasive vasectomy, which may or may not be reversible,264 teaches the virtues of
responsibility. Instead, his message simply scares men into choosing their freedom
from restraint over their rights to procreate and to personal autonomy. Judge
Foellger backs his position only by proclaiming, “I felt like [they] were
indiscriminately procreating.”265 Clearly, the Judge is mandating his own moral
code.
Despite the constitutional issues looming over the Foellger cases, Judge
Foellger’s offer may be illegal on other grounds “because nothing in the Kentucky
Child Support Guidelines authorizes a judge to use this technique as a remedial
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measure.”266 While state law often authorizes a circuit judge in a court of general
jurisdiction to employ “equitable remedies,”267 the mere definition of “equitable
remedy” pulls the ground out from underneath this argument.
An equitable remedy, simply stated, signifies that “no other adequate remedy at
law”268 exists. Here, plenty of alternative, adequate remedies exist. Better
legislation, harsher probation guidelines, state-supervised employment – all
constitute adequate remedies that better serve the defined probationary purposes,
without offending the fundamental right to procreate. Despite these obvious
alternatives, Judge Foellger makes no plans to discontinue his sterilization scheme.269
In his opinion for the Skinner Court, which effectually overturned Buck v. Bell,
Justice Douglas states, “[t]he power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, farreaching and devastating effects. In evil or reckless hands it can cause races or types
which are inimical to the dominant group to whither and disappear. There is no
redemption for the individual whom the law touches . . . . He is forever deprived of
his basic liberty.”270 In the spirit of the Supreme Courts of Ohio and Wisconsin,
Judge Foellger fervently ignores the cautionary foresight of the United States
Supreme Court.
VII. BETTER SOLUTIONS THAN A BAN ON PROCREATION
A. Precautionary Measures, A Less Intrusive Means Standard for the Courts
There is no doubt that the child support dilemma in the United States is
measurably grave, causing children to be raised in poverty.271 As the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin points out, the deadbeat parent epidemic fosters a crisis with
devastating implications for our children.272 Of those single-parent households with
established child support awards or orders, approximately one-third do not receive
any payments, while another one-third receive only partial payment.273 The
nonpayment of child support frequently presses single mothers below the poverty
line.274
Writing for the majority of the Court in Roe v. Wade, Justice Blackmun stated,
“[o]ur task, of course, is to resolve the issue by constitutional measurement, free of
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emotion and of predilection.”275 States always have an important, if not compelling
interest, to see that children are sufficiently supported.276 However, when a
fundamental right is at issue, an appellate court should utilize a more searching
review of the probation conditions. Constitutional analysis of the right to procreate
must take center stage over the emotionality of the matter. The stakes are too high in
these cases.277
While the Ohio Supreme Court seemingly settled that, had the Talty community
control sanction contained a durational limit278 the sanction may be a valid one, other
proactive states balance their probationary goals and statutory ends against a
different, more searching backdrop, a “less intrusive means” standard.279 As a case
of first impression to the Indiana courts, Trammell v. State280 serves as an illustrative
analysis of more searching standards of review of probation conditions when
fundamental rights are impinged.
As in Ohio and Wisconsin, Indiana trial courts retain broad discretion when
imposing probation conditions.281 In Indiana, the goal of these conditions is to
produce a law-abiding citizen and to protect the public.282 In some instances,
probation conditions may impinge upon the probationer’s exercise of an otherwise
constitutionally protected right.283 These impingements must be constructed to
achieve the explicit goals of protecting the community and promoting the
probationer’s rehabilitation process.284 Expressed in other terms, the condition must
“have a reasonable relationship to the treatment of the accused and the protection of
the public.”285
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Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973) (Blackmun, J. delivered the opinion of the
Court).
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When a probationer argues that a condition is unduly intrusive on a
constitutionally-held right, the Indiana appellate courts balance the following: (1) the
purpose sought to be served by probation; (2) the extent to which constitutional
rights enjoyed by law abiding citizens should be afforded to probationers; and (3) the
legitimate needs of law enforcement.286 Even if these factors weigh in favor of the
state of Indiana, the state must meet one last element: that there are no less intrusive
means available to accomplish these goals.287
The Trammell court cites many examples of what constitutes “less intrusive
means.”288 In the case of Kristie Trammell, mother of J.T., such means include the
requirement that Trammell submit to pregnancy testing. If she were to become
pregnant, Trammell would be forced into prenatal and neonatal programs under the
supervision of her probation officer and attending physician.289 If the state
determines that Trammell is unfit to be a parent, protective services could remove
the child and place it in foster care.290
Because the Trammell court identified such obvious examples of less intrusive
means to achieve the goals of probation, while determining that the antiprocreation
restriction did not meet its rehabilitative end, the Trammell court vacated the
antiprocreation restriction.291
Applying the Trammell court’s test to Oakley, the Oakley court would reach a
more equitable result.292 For example, Wisconsin statutory law allows courtdetermined support obligations to be enforced through wage-assignments.293
Considering Oakley’s ability to work and inability to sustain employment,294 an
286
State v. Trammell, 751 N.E.2d 283, 289 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). California courts use a
slightly more stringent, narrowly tailored test. In addressing the “reasonably related” prong,
the court will invalidate a condition if it: “(1) has no relationship to the crime which the
offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not itself criminal, and (3) requires or
forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality. Furthermore, where a
condition impinges on a fundamental right, the court must determine whether the condition is
impermissibly overly broad.” Pointer, 151 Cal. 3d at 1139; see also Dominguez, 256
Cal.App.2d at 627.
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In support of its decision to utilize the reasonability standard, the majority in Oakley
cites various courts that employ the reasonability standard “in analyzing a probation that
infringes upon a convicted individual’s fundamental right . . . .” State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d
200, 210 (Wis. 2001). Such cases include restrictions placed upon the fundamental rights to
free speech, free exercise of religion and voting. Id. The majority found that the condition
was “narrowly tailored to serve the State's compelling interest of having parents support their
children . . . [and] to serve the State's compelling interest in rehabilitating Oakley through
probation rather than prison.” Id. at 212.
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alternative, the less intrusive means approach, easily translates. The Wisconsin trial
court could sentence Oakley to an appropriate prison term, stay the sentence, and
place him on probation.295 A condition of that probation would be that Oakley serve
a substantial amount of time in jail, with work release privileges.296
This kind of probation condition nearly serves all of the interests at stake. The
money earned from the work release program would benefit Oakley’s current
children. Further probation conditions would also include those that are actually
rehabilitative to Oakley, like parental counseling and other dependency counseling
should the Wisconsin trial court deemed them necessary. And finally, via the
restriction on his freedom from restraint, the Oakley majority receives what it has
demanded. By serving the needs of prison security while incarcerated, Oakley
would be prevented from procreating as conjugal visits could be denied.
B. Remedial Measure, Proactive Legislation
1. Current Legislation
The Framers did not intend that the courts legislate from the bench.297 While it
was hoped that the courts would function as a blockade against unauthorized
assumptions of power by the other branches of the government, it was believed that
the state legislatures would be “sure guardians of the people’s liberties.”298
The appropriate branch of the government to remedy the deadbeat parent crisis,
accordingly, is not the judiciary, but the legislature. Over the past ten years, in
response to the national attention this crisis has garnered, legislatures have
introduced and initiated laws criminalizing the non-payment of support.
Congress made non-payment of child support a federal criminal offense, under
certain circumstances, through the Child Support Recovery Act of 1992 (CSRA).299
The CSRA imposed criminal sanctions on those non-custodial parents who willfully
failed to pay past-due obligations owed to a child residing in another state.300
CSRA’s intent was to prevent non-custodial parents from fleeing across state lines in
order to avoid their payment obligations.301 A first-time conviction under the CSRA
is punishable by up to six months in prison and a fine,302 while a repeat offender may
be punished up to two years in prison.303
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Subsequently, Congress passed the Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act of 1998
(DPPA). Under the DPPA, non-payment of support obligations is prosecutable at
the federal level.304 The DPPA amended the CSRA of 1992, establishing violations
for interstate travel or foreign commerce when evading child support.305 To convict
a deadbeat parent under CSRA, the government must establish that (1) past-due child
support is in arrears $5,000 or more, (2) the children are under the age of majority,
(3) all civil remedies were exhausted, (4) no payments from the deadbeat parent were
received within the past twelve (12) consecutive months (a payment is considered
any amount), (5) there is evidence that the non-custodial parent had the ability to pay
and willfully failed to do so, and (6) there is proof that the non-custodial parent had
knowledge of the child support obligation.306
Many state laws now allow officials to suspend driver’s licenses, deny parents
passports who owe more than $5000, and require paternity matches at birth.307
According to Wade F. Horn, the assistant secretary for children and families at the
United States Department of Health and Human Services, the National Directory of
New Hires is the most effective national legislation to help remedy the child support
problem yet.308 The registry requires employers to submit lists of all new hires,
including their wages and unemployment claims, on a quarterly basis.309 Those
employees who have outstanding child support claims raised against them
automatically have their wages garnished.310 This legislation significantly increased
collections. From 2001 to 2002, collections grew by six percent.311
Proactive legislation like the National Directory of New Hires and the Deadbeat
Parents Punishment Act of 1998 work directly to achieve the states’ goal:
enforcement of child support obligations. Such legislation is necessary, as it avoids
offending the fundamental right to procreate.
2. Proposed Legislation
While Congress instituted compensatory legislation, more needs to be done. At
least two of the five prima facie elements of a CRSA action should be strengthened.
Currently, only children under the age of majority can benefit from this criminal
action.312 If Congress extended the requisite age such that children could sue
deadbeat parents when the children reach the age of majority, deadbeat parents
would have less of an opportunity to avoid their responsibilities. If Congress
extended eligibility for suit to twenty-one years old, these children would be given
three years at a legally competent age to determine, on their own accord, whether the
304
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action should be brought. This revised requirement acts in both a punitive manner
(punishing the deadbeat parent for his or her lack of support during the child’s
minority), but it is rehabilitative for the child. The child, in his or her majority, is
finally given the control to bring their parent to justice.
Also, Congress should dispense of the requirement to exhaust all civil remedies
before bringing a CRSA action. The requirement should rest on the number of pastviolations a deadbeat parent has accrued. If a deadbeat parent violates his or her
support obligations a determinable amount of times, the child, after each new
violation, should immediately be allowed to bring suit, instead of needing to exhaust
all civil remedies for each new violation. A child who is forced to wait that much
longer is not only a drain on society’s resources, but is suffering from lostopportunities, which only a sufficiently-funded childhood can provide.
All of these legislative measures are truly compensatory and punish those parents
who do not fulfill their obligations. The legislative branches of the state and federal
governments possess a greater ability to assess and institute programs that actually
compensate the children involved. While the protection of fundamental rights is
often left to the courts, decisions like Talty and Oakley leave room for the courts to
abdicate this responsibility.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is well settled that probationers do not enjoy the same degree of freedom as
non-criminals.313 When dealing with a basic civil right of man,314 however, the
courts should submit to a test that safeguards the probationer and society from its
overstretched arm. If such a right is at stake, no court should have the means to
extinguish that right permanently, or conditionally, if less intrusive means are
available to achieve the same goal.
Antiprocreation sanctions as probation conditions cannot feasibly solve the
deadbeat parent problem because: they are not rehabilitative, they do not improve a
deadbeat parent’s financial or employment status, and they do not educate. When
courts uphold these restrictions, the problems created by the restrictions outweigh
their minimal beneficial value. Moreover, courts upholding these conditions seem
to, at all costs, avoid addressing how these restrictions affect women’s rights.
Women probationers subject to the same sentence suffer an unfair disadvantage as
compared to their male counterparts. If a woman probationer chooses to carry the
fetus to term, the state will inevitably discover her pregnancy. Men will not suffer
this same result.
Non-criminal female partners of male probationers, sentenced under these
probation conditions, now face a burdensome decision upon becoming pregnant:
carry the child to term and send the child’s father to jail, or terminate the pregnancy
under this duress. The United States Supreme Court dictates that the government
may not unduly burden a woman’s right to an abortion.315 If this coin is flipped, the
government should not unduly burden a woman’s right to have a child. The
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conditions restricting a male probationer’s right to procreate, naturally, and
inseparably, burden his non-criminal partner’s right to conceive a child.
While judges likely feel that they stand at an impasse – that any remedy they
institute for non-payment of child support produces no desirable results – this
hardship does not constitute a valid argument to use the right to procreate as a
bartering chip. The protection of reproductive rights in the probation context
demands, at the very least, a less intrusive means test. If courts are forced to adopt
the test, different solutions become readily apparent, such as work release programs
for the offending parent.
Furthermore, proactive legislation on behalf of the state and federal legislatures
presents more effective options than those the courts have the ability to institute or
develop. Legislatures have the ability to institute truly compensatory means, like
wage garnishing and new hire registries that work directly to compensate the
children of deadbeat parents.316 Legislatures need to recognize the inability of the
courts to do this, and activate widespread, positive change.
The United State Supreme Court describes the right to procreate as one that the
Constitution “jealously guards.”317 While the Oakley court focused solely on its
desire to stop the production of more victims, abdicating its responsibility to guard a
constitutional right, the Talty court leaves little room for comfort in its approving
language of the Oakley decision. If appellate courts reviewed probation conditions
that impinge on procreation rights with the Trammell special scrutiny standard, the
courts, in the absence of legislative action, could design appropriate and effective
solutions to the difficulties of designing a proper probation sentence.
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